ANALYSIS OF ASSEMBLY EXECUTION TIME

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OUTLINE



2 Analysing the control flow graph



ONCLUSION

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ASSEMBLY EXECUTION TIME

Assume this trivial snippet of code:

```
int mult(int a, int b) {
    int i, sum = 0;
    for (i = 0; i < b; i++)
        sum += a;
    return sum;
}</pre>
```

In this example:

- The time spent in the for loop depends on b.
- If it is a cryptographic function → time will leak information.

LEAK DETECTION

Can we find a way to **detect these leaks**?

We analyse **assembly code**, it has 2 main advantages:

- Execution time depends on the assembly code only.
- **2** We know how much time each instruction lasts.

SIMPLIFYING THE PROBLEM

- x86 assembly is complex.
- We used a softcore CPU on the FPGA4U: Nios II/e.
- Simple architecture, similar to microcontrollers:
 - No cache, no pipelining.
 - Deterministic execution time.



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INTRUCTION SET

- Nicely encoded instruction set.
- First step \rightarrow write a disassembler.

31	30	29	28	27	26	25	24	23	22	21	20	19	18	17	16	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	32	1	0
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FIGURE: Format of an I-type instruction.

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CONTROL FLOW GRAPH

From the disassembled code, we can generate a **control flow** graph.



FIGURE: A control flow graph.

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DATA DEPENDENCIES

We keep a map for each instruction, indicating **register dependencies**.

The dependencies are **forwarded** in the control graph.

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WORKLIST ALGORITHM

We start with a **worklist** with the **first node** in it.

Then we **repeat** the following:

- O Pick an element of the worklist.
- **OMERGINAL OPERATION OF A CONTROL OF A CONTR**
- **O** Analyse current instruction.
- If dependencies have changed → add successors to the worklist.

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CONVERGENCE

We are working in a **lattice**:

- Dependencies are a list of sets.
- Easy to define a **partial order** on it.


Our update function is **monotonic** (we only add dependencies, never remove).

 \rightarrow Tarski's fixed point theorem guarantees that we will converge eventually.

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CONTROL AND TIME DEPENDENCIES

Consider the following example (r2 depends on r5):



- \rightarrow The **execution time** will depend on r5.
- \rightarrow The **value** of r8 will depend on r5.

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
TIME AND CONTROL DEPENDENCIES

To find whether a branch introduces **time or control dependency**, we need to find the **merging point**.

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Post dominators

Find the **immediate post-dominator** of the branch instruction, i.e. the first instruction that will be executed whether the condition is **true** or **false** (\rightarrow the merging point).




Well-known algorithms exist to compute those (ex: Tarjan's algorithm).

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CONTROL FLOW DEPENDENCIES


All operations **results** are **tainted** by the **branch condition**, until we reach a post-dominator.



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TIME DEPENDENCY

- Time is recorded in both branches.
- If 2 branches merge with a **different time**, we add a **time dependency** on the branch condition.



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FUNCTION CALLS

- Function calls are handled
- We need to manage the **stack** as well
- Very simple symbolic execution to know the stack pointer.

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STUDY CASE - MULTIPLICATION IN GALLOIS FIELD

Multiplication in Gallois field:

```
/* Multiply two numbers in the GF(2^8) finite field defined
  * by the polynomial x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 */
uint8_t gmul(uint8_t a, uint8_t b) {
  uint8_t p = 0;
  uint8_t counter;
  uint8 t hi bit set:
  for(counter = 0; counter < 8; counter++) {</pre>
    if((b & 1) == 1)
      p ^= a:
    hi_bit_set = (a & 0x80);
    a <<= 1:
    if(hi bit set == 0x80)
      a ^{=} 0x1b; /* x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x + 1 */
    b >>= 1:
  }
  return p;
3
```

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
UNSAFE VERSION SAFE VERSION EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION

UNSAFE VERSION

Now, consider b contains some **sensitive information** (e.g. the key being used).


```
for(counter=0; counter < 8; counter++) {
  if((b & 1) == 1)
      p ^= a;
   ...
}</pre>
```

Our tool reports a time dependency on b.



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SAFE VERSION



Unsafe version Safe version **Experimental verification**


EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION

- We can test both versions on an FPGA4U.
- Measure the execution time as a function of b.

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UNSAFE VERSION SAFE VERSION EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION

EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION



Future work Questions

EXPERIMENTAL VERIFICATION

In this case, our tool provides correct results.

FUTURE WORK

- Analyse memory operations.
- Handle recursive function calls.
- Analysis of more complex programs.
- Analysis of **pipelined processors**.

FUTURE WORK

Future work Questions

Thanks for your attention.

Questions ?

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Future work Questions

BACKUP

Backup

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Future work Questions

LATTICE DEFINITION

Registers: $S = \{r1, ...r31\}$ Dependencies: $(d_{r1}, d_{r2}, ...d_{r31}), d_* \in 2^S$ Lattice: $(d_{r1}, ...d_{r31}) \subseteq (d'_{r1}, ...d'_{r31}) \leftrightarrow \bigwedge_{i \in S} d_i \subseteq d'_i$